Duquesne Law Review
Volume 35
Number 1 Special Issue: A Symposium on
Physician-Assisted Suicide

Article 13

1996

Defining the Terminally Ill: Insights from SUPPORT
Joanne Lynn
Frank E. Harrell Jr.
Felicia Cohn
Mary Beth Hamel
Neal Dawson

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joanne Lynn, Frank E. Harrell Jr., Felicia Cohn, Mary B. Hamel, Neal Dawson & Albert W. Wu, Defining the
Terminally Ill: Insights from SUPPORT, 35 Duq. L. Rev. 311 (1996).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol35/iss1/13

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Defining the Terminally Ill: Insights from SUPPORT
Authors
Joanne Lynn, Frank E. Harrell Jr., Felicia Cohn, Mary Beth Hamel, Neal Dawson, and Albert W. Wu

This symposium article is available in Duquesne Law Review: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol35/iss1/13

Defining the "Terminally Ill:" Insights

from SUPPORT
Joanne Lynn, M.D.*
Frank E. Harrell,Jr., Ph.D.**
Felicia Cohn, Ph.D.***
Mary Beth Hamel, M.D., M.P.H.****
Neal Dawson, M.D.*****
Albert W. Wu, M.D.******
For the SUPPORT Investigators
Being classified as "terminally ill" conveys a special status for
certain public policies. Terminally ill individuals are eligible for
hospice care funded by Medicare and also qualify to effectuate
their living wills.' Under several current proposals, terminally
ill individuals would also be permitted to have physician assistance in suicide.2 The cases currently before the United States
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1. 42 USCA § 1395d(4); Miesel A. The Right to Die; 2nd ed. (John Wiley & Sons
Inc., NY) 1989.
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Supreme Court require that a patient be terminally ill in order to
have a Constitutional right to have a physician assist in suicide. 3
This article delineates three potential strategies for defining "terminally ill" and the empirical problems with each for purposes of
policy development and interpretation. The evidence provided in
this article shows that each of these strategies is so problematic
that it seems untenable to have physician-assisted suicide
restricted to those classified as "terminally ill."
In order for the categorization of "terminally ill" to be useful in
policy, the following criteria apply:
1. A clear definition of "terminal illness" so that almost all
individuals may be classified correctly;
2. A reasonable survival period of persons who are categorized as "terminally ill" (in order to make, effect, and be
affected by decisions or to receive benefits);
3. A period of "terminal illness" recognizable for most lethal
chronic diseases;
4. Competence of persons within the category, at least for
part of their time as "terminally ill."
Surprisingly, public policy has not been forced to clarify this
category. The Medicare hospice benefit, for example, is limited to
persons whose physicians attest that the patient has "a terminal
illness with a life expectancy of six months or less."4 Neither
statute nor regulation, however, delineates exactly how to translate the life expectancy requirement. One might infer that a "life
expectancy of six months or less" means that any patient with
less than a fifty-fifty chance of surviving for that time period
would be eligible. The program, however, has not been implemented to reflect this interpretation. Only 15% of patients
receiving hospice care under Medicare are alive for six months or
more, and the median survival in hospice is about thirty-six
days.- Hospice patients generally have much worse than a 50-50
chance to live six months. In fact, inspectors acting for Medicare
have investigated certain hospices which were admitting unusual numbers of long-term survivors (more than six months) and
have required repayment to Medicare for the care of these
110); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert.granted, Vacco v. Quill, 65 U.S.L.W.
3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858); C.S. Campbell et al., Conflicts of Conscience:Hos-

pice and Assisted Suicide, HASTINGS

CENTER

REPoRT 36-43 (May/June 1996); A Model

State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARvARD JoURNAL ON
LEGISLATION 1 (Winter 1996).
3. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790; Quill, 80 F.3d 716.

4. Xact Medicare Services, Medicare Part B Reference Manual, Revision 020,
August 23, 1996.
5. N.A. Christakis & J.J. Escarce, Survival of Medicare PatientsAfter Enrollment
in Hospice Programs,335 N.

ENG.

J. MED. 172-78 (1996).
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patients.6 A group sponsored by the National Hospice Organization has responded by drafting criteria for enrollment in hospice. 7 However, the group is unable to define successful
compliance with the "less than six months survival" rule. Thus,
it is difficult to determine whether the group has chosen the correct thresholds of disease severity. Should no one with better
than a 10% chance to survive six months be enrolled? Or should
the cutoff be set at a 50% chance?
Current proposals for legalizing physician-assisted suicide
restrict eligibility to the "terminally ill." None of the proposals
note or resolve the problems with defining that category. The
discussion that follows sets forth three approaches for defining
the term "terminally ill" and illuminates various problems with
each based on an analysis of a large database collected from seriously ill hospitalized patients.

I.

THE

SUPPORT

STUDY AND ITS PROGNOSTIC MODEL

SUPPORT is the Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments, a five-hospital
study of treatments and decision-making for seriously-ill
patients." SUPPORT enrolled 4301 patients between the years
1989 and 1991 and another 4,804 between the years 1992 and
1994. Every patient entering the five study hospitals during the
four years of enrollment was evaluated for inclusion and was
enrolled if the patient had one of nine serious illnesses at a stage
worse than a defined threshold of severity. These illnesses,
selected on the basis of high expected mortality rates and treatment dominantly in hospitals, included: acute respiratory failure or multiple organ system failure with sepsis; chronic
obstructive lung disease; congestive heart failure; cirrhosis;
coma; lung cancer; colon cancer; and multiple organ system failure with malignancy. The severity thresholds were established
to select patients who were likely to survive more than 48 hours,
but who otherwise represented advanced stages of the various
diseases. Using these criteria, about 3% of the admissions to
these hospitals were enrolled and accounted for 19% of the inhospital deaths. 9 The overall population had 47% mortality
6. J. Lynn, Caringat the End of Life, 335 N. ENG. J. MED. 201-02 (1996).
7. National Hospice Organization, Hospice Fact Sheet, October 10, 1995.
8. SUPPORT, J CUn Evi 43(suppl):1S-123S (D.J. Murphy & L.E. Cluff eds.,
1990); The SUPPORT Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Carefor Seriously Ill

Hospitalized Patients:The Study to UnderstandPrognosesand Preferencesfor Outcomes
and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591-1598 (1995).
9. W.A. Knaus et al., The SUPPORTprognostic model: objective estimates of survival for seriously ill hospitalized adults, ANN. INTERN. MED. 121,191-203 (1995).
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within six months. 10 The exact enrollment criteria for each disease have been published."
A model was developed for these patients which combined an
array of laboratory measurements, vital signs, and diagnoses in
a mathematical formula which estimates the patient's prognosis
for survival to each day for the ensuing six months. 2 The
model's estimates were very close to the actual survival of a new
group of patients (good calibration) and to the estimates made by
physicians. The nature of this kind of model and how to assess
its performance has been summarized. 3 The data from SUPPORT provide the largest available source of empirical data on
prognosis that are available for defining terminal illness in hospitalized patients with various diseases.
II.

APPROACHES TO DEFINING "TERMINALLY ILL"

Three basic approaches are possible for defining the "terminally ill:" subjective judgment, statistical prognosis, or clinical
condition. The first approach turns the determination over to
someone, with some sort of process required, but without objective criteria. For example, the usual approach regarding living
wills has been to delegate the determination of whether an individual is terminally ill to a physician, perhaps with some consultation required.' 4 Other possibilities abound, including allowing
the patient to make the determination, creating a committee for
review, requiring judicial review, requiring consensus between
the attending physician and named family members, etc. The
subjective judgment approach is advantageous because it allows
the individual making the judgment to consider many factors
that are difficult to measure, such as patient preferences, weariness, readiness to die, spiritual preparation, suffering, and so
forth.
From a public policy perspective, however, a subjective
approach virtually guarantees substantial variation in application, a large number of contested cases, and an inability to hold
anyone accountable since there are no articulated standards.
There is no uniform understanding of the meanings of words
used to represent quantifiable categories.1 5
10. The SUPPORT Investigators, A Controlled Trial.
11. Knaus et al., supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. Id.; J. Lynn et al., Accurate Prognosticationsof Death: Opportunitiesand Challenges for Clinicians,WEST J. MED. 163, 250-257 (1995).
14. Miesel, supra note 1.
15. G.P. Bryant & G.R. Norman, Expressions of Probability:Words and Numbers,
N. ENG. J. MED. 302, 411 (1980); A. Kong et al., How Medical ProfessionalsEvaluate
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The other two approaches limit the contribution of individual
judgment and instead define the population either by a statistical prognosis or by showing that the patient has crossed an identifiable threshold in the course of an illness.
The statistical prognosis approach requires that public policy
(e.g., in defining the population eligible for physician-assisted
suicide) adopt a definition that requires that a terminally ill person has "less than x% chance to live y time." The statistical prognosis approach could be more complex, for example, by stating
that the patient's survival must also be less than (x+a)% at some
later time (y+b).
The fact that a statistical prognosis must include both a rate of
survival and a time frame is almost as self-evident as it is widely
ignored. The Medicare hospice benefit, notably, manages to give
a date but not a rate. One does not know what rate of six-month
survival should make a patient eligible and what should be seen
as including too many or too few patients. If physician-assisted
suicide is to be limited to persons defined as "terminally ill," then
a statistical definition must state both the maximum expected
survival rate and the time frame (or a statistical equivalent, such
as mean expected survival time), as well as some statement of
the data and analyses required and the rules for handling inadequately known prognoses.
A second data-driven approach is to define an observable
clinical threshold of illness for each fatal disease. A patient with
an illness expected to be fatal will be classified as "terminal" if
the patient's health becomes worse than a stated threshold. For
example, a person with severe lung disease might be designated
as "terminal" when the blood concentration of oxygen at rest
deteriorates to a certain point. However, such delineation would
have to account for substantially different survival spans for various patients (with differing reserves, concurrent illness, etc.)
and for different illnesses. Applying these criteria, for example,
"terminally ill" might include all patients with pancreatic cancer
and pain, for whom survival is usually a few months, and also all
patients living "bed-to-chair" with congestive heart failure, for
whom survival is usually more than a year.
The two objective approaches overlap substantially: the
thresholds would be roughly congruent with the desired statistical prognosis. However, the statistical approach requires a sizable investment in research to generate the statistical model,
Expressions of Probability,315 N. ENG. J. MED. 740-44 (1986); M.A. Nakao & S. Axelrod,
Numbers are Better Than Words: Verbal Specifications of Frequency Have no Place in
Medicine, 74 AM. J. MED. 1061-65 (1983).
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which can then adjust for an array of predictor variables, including other diseases and overall physiological reserve. There will
be many ambiguous cases, nevertheless, and patient eligibility
under the selected criterion will not correspond to any discernible clinical event. On the other hand, use of a clinical threshold
yields more efficient administration, since this approach turns on
noting that the patient has had something happen, such as a hospitalization, a critically worsening laboratory value, the discovery of spread of disease, and so forth. This approach, however,
does not reflect the complex interaction of multiple factors in
shaping lifespan, such as deficiencies in physiologic reserve and
the presence of complicating illnesses. Thus, there will be much
more variation in the expected survival time of the population
labeled as "terminally ill" under this approach.
The interrelationships of the two kinds of objective approaches
are illuminated in Figure 1. The prognostic approach uses certain characteristics to predict survival time and divides the population into three parts (right side of figure 1): those known to
have prognoses below a specified probability of surviving, those
known to have prognoses above a specified probability of surviving, and those whose prognoses are uncertain with regard to the
limit.
An additional factor not considered in this article is the necessary confidence one must have in the prognosis, e.g. _>75% certainty that the prognosis is above or below the threshold.
Intersection of Prognostic and Threshold-Centered Approaches

•a

Figure 1. Diagrammatic partitioning of the population using
two approaches to objective definitions of "terminally ill:" by
statistical prognosis and by clinical threshold.
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The threshold criterion approach builds upon clinical evidence
of disease severity and also divides the population into three
parts: those individuals with illnesses which fall below some
critical threshold; those individuals with illnesses which meet
some less serious threshold, though are still expected to die of
that illness; and those individuals who do not meet either threshold (i.e. the individuals are not sick, or only moderately so, or do
not have a known fatal condition). Table 1 gives an example of
the kind of condition which could be found in each partition of
the population, using a prognosis of <20% to live six months in
the right column and a set of thresholds similar to SUPPORT
enrollment criteria on the left.16 It is not clear which of these
partitions would denote the "terminally ill" for any particular
policy purpose, nor is it obvious which usage would best serve the
population.
1: Descriptions and examples of patients in each cell in
Figure 1, using an objective prognosis of less than 20% to
survive six months for the prognostic criterion.
TABLE

Description
near death and very ill
b

very ill with fatal disease,
statistical prognosis uncertain
very bad prognosis, but not yet
very ill
very ill, eventually fatal, but
known to have longer life
expectancy
moderately ill, eventually fatal but
uncertain prognosis
no illness, but bad prognosis

c
d
e
f
g
h
i

moderately ill, fatal illness,
prognosis better than 20% for
six months
not ill, but uncertain prognosis
not ill, no reason for limited
Drornosis

III.

Patient Example
in shock from sepsis complicating

metastatic cancer
bedbound with congestive heart
failure
early pancreatic cancer
Tay-Sachs infant, Huntington's
disease, severe Parkinson's
Alzheimer's dementia with
malnutrition
severe congenital lipoprotein
abnormality
early metastatic breast cancer
asymptomatic person with
extremely high blood pressure
healthy person

SuBEcTrE APPROACHES TO DECIDING "TERMINAL ILLNESS"

One method of distinguishing the terminally ill from the sick
or even the merely mortal is to apply individual judgment.
Although the patient or a committee could render a judgment,
16.

Knaus, supra note 9.

318

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 35:311

actual or proposed statutes and regulations suggest that physicians make these determinations. How well can physicians be
expected to do?
Although information about physician performance is available from many sources, the following statement is a previously
unpublished insight from SUPPORT: Physicians often do not
acknowledge impending death until late in the dying process
when it is very certain. In hospitals, a patient whose heart stops
will immediately receive resuscitation efforts unless a physician
writes a "do not resuscitate" ("DNR") order precluding such
attempts. Since all dying persons are potential candidates for
resuscitation and because it is usually considered more harmful
than beneficial to try to resuscitate a person dying from a known
fatal disease, the timing of and rate at which DNR orders are
written can be used as a proxy measure for the rate at which
impending death is noted and plans acknowledging that eventuality can be made. Figure 2 shows the rate of DNR orders by
days before actual death for the support population in the hospital on those days, and for some examples by disease.
1.0

Proportion DNRs of Pts who Died in Hospital
a Lung Cancer
bColon Cancer

0.8'
.

c CHF
d
e

Cirrhosis
All

00.6'

0.4-

0.2'

0.0
7

54

3210
Days Until Death, d

Figure 2. Proportion of the support population, overall and by
disease, which had a DNR order, by day before death.
Figure 2 shows that DNR is generally applied late in the
course of illness, usually in the last few days. For example, less
than half of cancer patients have a DNR order one week before
death. Although impending death is more predictable in cancer
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patients, physicians are not managing these patients as if they
were dying until death is clearly imminent.
Additionally, physicians' practices ordinarily vary substan17
tially from region to region and from physician to physician.
This variation may be immaterial to many issues but is troubling
to the issue of whether physicians should be permitted to provide
lethal drugs for patients the physicians deem to be terminally ill.
If terminal illness is not recognized until late within SUPPORT
patients' last two weeks, and if there is substantial variation
among physicians, those patients included within the category of
"terminally ill" would often have little time in that status and
would be included as "terminally ill" only in some regions or with
some physicians.
IV. A STATISTICAL CRITERION FOR TERMINAL ILLNESS
Some categories reflect clear and natural divides, such as the
categories of male and female. Often categories, however, are
unavoidably arbitrary such as the categories of tall and short.
Terminal illness as a statistical construct creates an arbitrary
divide along a continuum that starts with optimal health, continues though various degrees of illness, and ends with states imminently incompatible with life. In order to understand the merits
and difficulties with a statistical definition, it is necessary to
review the actual survival curve for persons with less than a 50%
chance to live six months according to the SUPPORT prognostic
model. A 50% criterion represents the most inclusive statistical
specification of a prognosis of "six months" as the definition of
terminal illness.

17.

J.E.

STATES (1996).

WENNBERG, THE DARTmouTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UN'rED
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Observed Survival in Patients with
Predicted 6m Survival <= 0.5

o

-

-

a ARF/MOSF w/Sepsis
b All
c CHF
d Lung Cancer

Years

Figure 3. Actual survival of patients with SUPPORT model
prognoses on their third study day of 50% or less chance to
live six months, by disease.
The prognostic curve reflects a population whose members
generally die quickly. Despite having the same range of prognoses, using one of the best models available, the mortality rates
of the various illnesses differ over time, with half as many people
being alive with lung cancer in a coma as with CHF at six
months. Except for colon and lung cancer, each illness has a substantial "tail" of long term survivors: more than one-fifth of some
patient groups are alive after two years.
If a definition of terminal illness were chosen that used a statistical prognosis of 50% survival at six months or less, questions
of inclusion would be raised for patients with estimates near that
divide. To illustrate the survival scenario for those whose sixmonth prognosis is near 50%, Figure 4 replicates Figure 3 above,
but for those patients whose prognosis lies between 40% and 60%
for six month survival.
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Observed Survival in Patients with
Predicted 6m Survival 0.4 - 0.6

0

-

-

o. .

0

-

a ARF/MOSF w/Sepsi
b All
c CHF
d Lung Cancer

3

12
Years

Figure 4. Actual survival of patients with SUPPORT model
prognoses on their third study day of 40-60% chance to live
six months, by disease.
In the population near the divide, obviously more "area lies
under the curve," a representation of the amount of time that
persons like this are still alive (if not dead by suicide). The size
of the "tail" of long term survival in Figure 4 is approximately
double that of Figure 3, with nearly two-fifths of patients with
congestive heart failure still alive after two or three years.
Such large "tails" should be troubling to those trying to craft a
definition of terminal illness suitable for allowing easier suicide.
If the reason for creating a category of "terminally ill" is to
include only persons with little life left to live, then the substantial rate of potential survivors refutes that aim. Policymakers
might, therefore, choose to use a much more restrictive criterion,
such as a <20% chance to live for six months. A set of curves for
that group is given in Figure 5.
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Observed Survival in Patients with
Predicted 6m Survival <= 0.2

o

a ARF/MOSF w/Sepsis
b All
c CHF
d Lung Cancer
d
._0

CD

0

I

Years

2

3

Figure 5. Actual survival of patients with SUPPORT model
prognoses on their third study day of 20% or less to live six
months, by disease.
Most individuals with prognoses this poor die within a few
weeks. For many of these individuals, death is so close that
there would not be any time to consider and effectuate a choice to
die much differently. With prognoses this serious, few survive
one year, though there are always some individuals who live for
several years.
This set of figures is not intended to provide arguments for or
against any one possible criterion. Instead, these figures show
that every criterion has very serious problems and complexities,
even in a population for whom good models for predicting survival is available. The number of long-term survivors increases
when more inclusive criteria are applied while the number of
very early deaths increases when more restrictive criteria are
used. No statistical criterion seems to capture only the population which was really intended.
An additional point of concern is the interplay between serious
illness and competence. As people became sicker, they were less
likely to be competent. SUPPORT had two indicators of whether
or not a patient was competent (Table 2). First, the Glasgow
coma score assessed on the third day of the study provided a
measure of serious neurological impairment (inability to move
one's eyes, to move one's body purposefully, or to respond to ver-
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bal stimuli). Patients whose scores were abnormal on this scale
were unlikely at that time to be competent to make any decisions
or to process information. However, patients with a normal Glasgow coma score might still be incompetent since higher order
functions (e.g., thinking, paying attention) are not measured on
this scale. Furthermore, patients with abnormal Glasgow coma
scores might improve at some later time although then their
prognoses would also improve. A second indicator of competence
was the ability to be interviewed for the study. Some noninterviewable patients, especially those whose communication
problems arose from being intubated for ventilator support, had
periods of greater ability to communicate or might have been
able to attend to some short presentation and respond "yes" or
"no." Similarly, some patients may have been interviewable only
in part of the four days allowed, days 2 through 5 of the study.
The rate of being too sick to be interviewed, nevertheless, gives
an estimate of the rate of incompetence.
TABLE 2: The rate of apparent incompetence for decision-

making for patients with various ranges of prognoses,* as
measured by two indices of mental functioning.
N

Abnormal Glasgow
Coma Score %

Too Sick for
Interview %

0-9%
10-19%

864
526

69
57

50
62

20-29%
30-39%
40-49%
50-59%
60-69%
70-79%
80-89%
90-100%

607
710
975
1208
1487
1636
1010
81

53
38
34
28
19
12
6
0

59
51
54
49
39
29
22
20

Prognosis

*

for surviving six months, by the SUPPORT prognostic model

A high likelihood of dying correlates closely with being disabled for decision-making purposes. The diseases that very sick,
dying individuals have and the treatments these individuals
undergo are likely to cause disorientation, sedation, drowsiness,
and the inability to attend to issues. Delirium is also commonplace and often unrecognized.' 8 If physician-assisted suicide is to
be restricted to those individuals who are capable of requesting it
at the time of the act, then those drafting policy will have to
18. J. Francis et al., A Prospective Study of Delirium in Hospitalized Elderly, 263
JAMA 1097-1101 (1990); S.K. Inouye et al., A Predictive Index for FunctionalDecline in
HospitalizedElderly Medical Patients,8 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 645-52 (1993).
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accept that a small number of individuals defined as "terminally
ill" according to a "tight" criterion (e.g., <20% probability of surviving 6 months) will be competent. If policy is to include a
broader range of prognoses so as to have more persons with contemporaneous competence, then it must include persons with
more uncertain and longer prognoses. Alternatively, policymakers could drop the requirement of contemporaneous competence
and allow some forms of advance direction. That provision, however, is not part of any current court case or legislative proposal,
most likely because it raises serious possibilities for abuse.
V. THE Limrrs OF PHYsIcIANs' ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE
IMPENDING DEATH

It is commonly believed that physicians know, or at least have
the potential to know, who is dying and when they are dying.
SUPPORT offers an interesting insight into the actual limits of
this ability, indicating that physicians' prognostications and a
"state of the art" statistical model substantially differ. Table 3
compares physicians' prognostications in SUPPORT to actual
survival for populations stratified by the prognostic model.
3: Actual patient survival at six months, in populations
with physician estimates of <.2 and <.5 survival for six
months
TABLE

MD Prognosis < 0.2 for 6 months
mean prog
%

MD Prognosis < 0.5 for 6 months
mean prog
%

Disease

N

estimate

surviving

N

estimate

surviving

ARF/MOSF
COPD
CHF
cirrhosis
coma
colon Ca
lung Ca
MOSFmalig

693
80
79
76
290
109
271
286

.08
.10
.06
.08
.06
.08
.08
.07

.22
.19
.43
.21
.12
.21
.14
.10

1096
178
192
155
344
160
387
380

.27
.32
.33
.26
.19
.25
.28
.21

.30
.36
.53
.29
.16
.27
.17
.15

ARF/MOSF

= acute respiratory failure and multiple organ system failure with
sepsis, which are presented together.

COPD

= chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (emphysema and chronic
bronchitis)
= congestive heart failure
= cancer
= multiple organ system failure with malignancy

CHF
Ca
MOSFmalig

Table 3 shows that physicians often erred in their estimations
of likely prognosis, especially when the physicians predicted low
probabilities of survival. Among patients with congestive heart
failure whose physicians estimated a chance of survival of less
than 20%, actual survival was more than double that upper limit
and was seven times the rate expected by the physicians. In con-
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trast, the rates of survival in most other categories are only
about twice the physician's prediction.
The SUPPORT population is a "best case" scenario since the
patients had been hospitalized, were well-diagnosed, had survived at least forty-eight hours (so the situation was well-understood), and were treated by highly skilled physicians. Cases
examined in less well-equipped settings, with less secure diagnoses, in a more dynamic clinical setting (such as in an emergency
room or with more sudden change in health) would probably
yield less ability to prognosticate impending death. Furthermore, the illnesses in SUPPORT were well-studied while prognostic models have not been developed for many diseases and
combinations of diseases, especially the multiple coincident frailties of old age.
Many of the SUPPORT patients, nevertheless, came upon
death with surprisingly optimistic prognoses. Figure 6 presents
the prognoses of patients who actually died in the hospital or
within a few days of discharge by giving the median prognoses
from the SUPPORT model for six month survival on each day
before death. As medians, these prognoses illustrate the experience of the "patient in the middle." To remind us of the variation, the vertical lines attached to the graph show the range from
the twenty-fifth percentile to the seventy-fifth percentile of model
estimates of survival.
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6-month Model Estimates, All Diseases, with Quartiles
1.0'

0.8'

0.6'

S0.4E
0.2

0.0'
7

6

5

4
Days to Death

3

2

1

Figure 6. Median predicted survival in SUPPORT, by day
before death, with interquartile range
On the day before the patient's death, the median patient in
SUPPORT was approximately to have about a 17% chance to live
two months and approximately a 7% chance to live six months.
One week earlier, those rates were 35% for six months and 51%
for two months. While a prognosis of 50% for two months is a
very serious prognosis, it is not clear that society desires to categorize individuals who still have a "fifty-fifty" chance to live two
months as "terminally ill" and certainly not as "imminently
dying." Yet, half of the patients in SUPPORT had prognoses better than this within a week of their deaths. Again, this poses a
policy dilemma. If the prognosis criterion is drawn tightly, most
people who actually die are excluded. If one allows a broader
range of prognoses, then many will actually survive for substantial periods of time. Analyses not illustrated here showed that
the physicians' estimates and the statistical models gave quite
similar prognoses, and that prognoses for six-month survival
decline less than 20% in comparison with estimates for two
months.
The dilemma for policymakers is compounded by the observation that different diseases have quite different courses near
death, and some of them are much more unpredictable than
others. Figures 7a-7d indicates the median prognoses for two-
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month survival on each day before death for each disease in the
SUPPORT study.
COPD/CHF/Cirrhosis
1.0
CHF
0.8'

of.6,
E
0.4'
0

0.2'

Cirrhosis

0.0
7

6

5

4

3

2

Days to Death

Figure 7a (Panels a-d). Median predicted survival in
SUPPORT, by day before death, for each SUPPORT
diagnosis: Panel a: Chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease; congestive heart failure; Cirrhosis
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Figure 7b. Panel b: Acute renal failure with multiple organ
system failure and sepsis; Multiple organ system failure
with malignancy
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Figure 7c. Panel c: Cancer

Coma
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Figure 7d. Panel d: Coma
Death resulting from congestive heart failure was much less
predictable than the others, and only coma was consistently
grim. The short-term prognosis in congestive heart failure was
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so unpredictable that even on the day before death, the median
patient had a prognosis of better than 50-50 to live two months.
Most patients with congestive heart failure severe enough to be
in the SUPPORT study were living a "bed to chair" existence
with periodic exacerbations of severe shortness of breath often
requiring hospital care. Most deaths, however, deemed sudden,
are probably precipitated by uncoordinated electrical activity in
the heart, called cardiac arrhythmias. There is an ongoing high
risk of this activity in seriously damaged hearts, but anticipating
an occurrence is more like predicting when and where lightening
will strike than predicting whether it will rain. It is very hard to
predict precisely when a particular person will be "hit." A
patient with this kind of disease lives with the ongoing risk of
death on any day but usually has little warning about when
death will actually occur. This is very different from dying from
lung cancer, where the patient is usually sickest on the day of
death, with signs of decline that had become increasingly obvious
over several weeks.
The additional implications for policy are abundant. First,
physicians are not likely to categorize patients with substantial
chances to survive as "terminally ill." Yet, since congestive heart
failure is the most common cause of death in the United States,
many individuals are going to arrive at death's door without ever
having a thoroughly dismal prognosis.
Furthermore, if one were to set some benefit or entitlement at
a statistical prognostic threshold at or below 50% to live two
months, most patients with congestive heart failure would never
qualify. In fact, just one week before their deaths, most patients
who died in SUPPORT would not have qualified as terminally ill
because their average two-month prognoses were too good. If the
criteria were set at a lower prognosis, however, only a small fraction of very sick persons (many of whom would be too sick to be
competent) would be included in the category.
Further exploration of differences among diseases is possible
with an examination of the typical survival curve for patients
with one of two diseases of different trajectories selected for the
same bad prognosis (20%) at six months.
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4: Proportion of SUPPORT patients by disease who
would be included in a "terminally ill" population as defined
by two thresholds, and the rates at which they die within
one and within twelve months.
TABLE

Disease

N

< 50% survival (6 mo.)
% alive
% alive
N
1 Mo.
12 mo.

< 20% survival (6 mo.)
N

% alive
1 Mo.

% alive
12 mo.

ARF/MOSF

3515

1333

49

26

458

28

12

COPD
CHF

967
1387

164
125

62
70

25
28

39
25

49
32

15
4

508
596
512
908
112

186
478
157
657
593

47
25
70
68
41

23
13
19
13
13

70
252
64
197
285

20
13
53
44
26

13
6
14
3
4

Cirrhosis
Coma
Colon Ca
Lung Ca
MOSF/Ca

Although the patients have the same upper limit on prognosis,
they vary substantially in the proportion of very early deaths and
of longer term survivals. Cancer has higher short term survival
(one month) but very low one-year survivals. Congestive heart
failure has very few patients with a prognosis under 20% for six
month survival. Most patients who have such a poor prognosis
die very quickly, with few lasting a year. Considering the findings in Figure 7 above, which shows that most congestive heart
failure patients die with a prognosis of at least 50% to live six
months, it seems likely that the few congestive heart failure
patients who have very bad prognoses (<20% for six month survival) are generally dying in a different way than are most congestive heart failure patients. Most likely, these patients have
severe dysfunction affecting more than one organ system and are
effectively dying from severe progressive physiological dysfunction rather than from the arrhythmias that more commonly
cause death in congestive heart failure.
Changing from an operational definition of prognosis of 50%
six-month survival to 20% would have quite different effects on
the size of the population in each disease. With congestive heart
failure and COPD, it nearly eradicates what is otherwise a large
group of hospitalized, fatally ill patients. The effect is much
more modest for ARF/MOSF, however, demonstrating that dying
after at least a short period with a poor prognosis is more commonplace in these illnesses.
VI.

PROGNOSTICATION BY DISEASE THRESHOLD

SUPPORT defined the categories for enrollment by using the
best evidence available to define a clinical threshold for each illness that could be expected to have no more than 50% survival in
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six months. SUPPORT, therefore, stands as an attempt to simulate one kind of definition of terminal illness. The actual criteria
for enrollment are complex and have been published elsewhere.' 9
The criteria generally require the most severe forms of each disease: congestive heart failure living from bed to chair, chronic
obstructive lung disease with extremely serious levels of oxygenation in the blood, etc. The survival curve for the entire study is
presented according to disease in Figure 9.

Observed Survival in All SUPPORT Patients
a ARF/MOSF w/Sepsis
b COPD
c CHF
d Cirrhosis
e Coma
f Colon Cancer
g Lung Cancer
h MOSF w/Malig

0

I2

3
Years

Figure 9. Proportion surviving over three years, by disease
Survival up to six months varied substantially among diseases, although the entire SUPPORT population had almost
exactly 50% mortality. The "tail" of survival, furthermore, had
very different shapes. In some diseases, such as coma, there was
almost no additional mortality past 6 months. In other diseases,
such as colon cancer, the initial rapid loss of life was not marked,
but the subsequent decline was unremitting and substantial
(colon cancer). In still other diseases, attrition was at a slower,
steady, rate throughout the period of study.
The SUPPORT population is arrayed by the frequency of prognoses for each disease in Figure 10.
19.
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Distribution of Prognoses by Disease Group
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Figure 10. Proportion of each SUPPORT population, by
disease, which had each prognosis on the third study day, for
survival to six months
Figure 10 demonstrates that even among a population chosen
on the basis of serious illness and aiming for no more than 50%
survival at six months with the best pre-existing data, different
patterns of six-month survival remain for each disease. The
ICU-treated categories (ARF/MOSF, MOSF with malignancy,
and coma) and lung cancer comprise most of the patients with
prognoses of less than 50% to live six months. Exceedingly few of
the patients with COPD or CHF actually had prognoses known
to be worse than "even chances" to survive six months.

VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Deciding who should be counted "terminally ill" will pose such
severe difficulties that it seems untenable as a criterion for permitting physician-assisted suicide. Allowing physicians (or anyone else) to decide who is terminally ill without standards or
guidance will result in uneven application with unjustified variations across diseases, across physicians, and across regions.
Efforts to gain entry into the category will engender substantial
litigation.
Adopting a statistical threshold entails a myriad problems.
Any such threshold is arbitrary and will incur a large number of
ambiguous cases, both because many prognoses are unavoidably
ambiguous and because the data are not available for many
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groups of dying persons. Furthermore, a restrictive threshold
will limit availability to a small proportion of those who die,
many of whom will be incompetent. It will also exclude almost all
of some commonplace causes of death. Conversely, a more inclusive threshold will entail allowing physician-assisted suicide for
a substantial number of persons who are otherwise destined to
survive for an extended period.
The last approach, determining a threshold of illness severity,
avoids some of the ambiguity but entails including a great
number of persons who live for a long time, most of whom are not
now commonly considered "terminally ill."
Varying definitions of "terminally ill" could be implemented for
different public policy purposes. An individual might be "terminally ill" for purposes of receiving hospice care, but not "terminally ill" for requesting physician-assisted suicide, or vice versa.
The effects of this approach, however, seem unsettling in the policy arena. This approach, furthermore, does not avoid the fundamental problem of delineating a clear and practical category for
each use.
The means of defining terminal illness described in this article
are almost entirely novel ways of examining data about seriously ill individuals. Until recently, there has been no research
of this sort and little motivation for it. This fact alone should
give pause to those individuals who would regulate important
public behavior on the basis of the category "terminally ill."
There has been so little research attention to this subject that
reliable data are generally unavailable for almost all important
questions in this area. The problems and possibilities are just
beginning to be recognized and described. Certainly this initial
perception is sufficient to evoke concern as to whether any definition would prove to be workable.
The data indicate that none of the criteria suggested in the
introduction as necessary for a practicable policy were met:
1. No strategy allows one to define the "terminally ill," with
clear and consistent classification of almost all patients;
2. At most possible thresholds of illness for most fatal illnesses, the period of survival with "terminal illness" will
often not be long enough to make and implement choices;
3. At most possible thresholds, "terminal illness" will not be
recognizable for most causes of death.
4. Narrow definitions will include mostly incompetent persons who survive for short periods while broader definitions will include more competent persons who are likely
to survive for prolonged periods.
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Defining terminal illness in any particular way will exclude some
who are now commonly considered terminally ill and will include
others who are not now commonly considered terminally ill.
Many people will have an uncertain status regardless of the definition selected. Patients labeled "terminally ill" may be too sick
for the designation to be useful or too healthy for it to be appropriate. Most individuals will arrive at death with uncertain
prognoses which still offer possibilities of substantial survivals.

